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The success with which middle income indebted developing countries have
gained access to private international finance in the 1990s is a tribute to their own
domestic economic performance, international policy in dealing with the debt crisis of the
1980s, and innovations in international financial markets. This paper emphasizes the role
of private infrastructure investment as a vehicle for attracting foreign capital to
developing countries in the 1  990s. The paper examines the determination of credit risk
premium on infrastructure projects in the country risk environment of developing
countries, and provides tentative quantitative evidence of the importance of
macroeconomic and project-specific attributes of project risk. The key finding is that the
market seems to impose a high risk premium on loans to countries with high inflation,
and to projects in the road sector.
I. Introduction
Recent debate on the causes of the upsurge in capital flows to developing
countries in the 1990s has offered three different perspectives. First, it is argued that the
main factors motivating capital flows have been external to developing countries and
have been related in particular to decline in the US interest rates (Calvo et al. 1993;
Fernandez-Arias, 1994). The second line of argument is that the surge in capital flows has
been the result of domestic economic reforms, including privatization of public
enterprises, liberalization of currency and capital accounts, and that these trends, along
with macroeconomic stabilization, have improved creditworthiness and have expanded
investment opportunities (Chuhan et al. 1994; and et al. 1996, U. Haque). Third, it is
observed that financial innovations, including the securitization of creditor commercial
bank loans by conversion into bonds, with partial multilateral guarantees, under the
Brady Plan, were critical in lifting the "debt overhang," and stimulating investment and
growth in debtor developing countries. (Claessens, et al. 1996; Dornbusch and Werner,
1994).
These perspectives have important implications for the sustainability of capital
flows and hence for policy design both at the national and international level. Thus, if the
surge in capital flows has been driven mostly by lower international (US) interest rates, as
is argued by some researchers, then a reversal in such rates would threaten the
1sustainability of capital flows.I By contrast, if the magnet for capital flows has been the
process of domestic economic reform and stabilization in the developing countries
themselves, sustainability would then be a function of the continuation of such reforms.
However, if the key to the successful return to creditworthiness of indebted (middle
income) developing countries and their ability to access international private finance in
the 1990s has been the policy-induced financial innovation and engineering under the
Brady Plan, there exists ground for official intervention in the credit relationship between
developed and developing countries. Such interventions could address specific agency
problems related to the asymmetry of information, market overreaction, and coordination
failure in international finance and/or transitional problems as developing countries move
to forge closer integration into global capital markets. 2
In this paper we offer a new perspective, emphasizing the role of private
infrastructure investments in developing countries as a vehicle for attracting foreign
capital. Our motivations are two. First, infrastructure investment has been the fastest
growing component of capital flows to developing countries, increasing from $1.3 billion
in 1986 to $27 billion in 1996 (see Table 1). Though the volume of such flows remains
small (12% of total'external gross flows in 1996), the potential for future growth is
substantial. 3 Second, we draw on certain characteristics of infrastructure investments,
including their complex risk profile, long pay-off period, and sensitivity to policy and the
regulatory climate, to establish links between capital flows to infrastructure and the
behavior of international interest rates, domestic reforms and liberalization, and financial
innovation. In essence, the financing of infrastructure in capital markets captures the key
elements of the above three explanations of capital flows.
Our treatment of infrastructure finance as a vehicle of capital flows to developing
countries assigns a central role to financial evaluation of foreign investment projects in
the country risk environment of developing countries. With a few exceptions, most
developing countries are still rated as "non-investment grade" by major credit rating
agencies (See Annex I). And while many countries have made substantial progress in
macroeconomic stabilization by reducing inflation and government deficits dramatically,
especially in high-inflation Latin American countries (see Annex I), and moved to
I This interpretation  places  the burden  of management  of international  capital  flows on the shoulders  of
industrial  countries'  monetary  authorities  in  promoting  policies  conducive  to low inflation  and low
interest  rates.
2The  case  for official  intervention  in the event  of financial  distress  by borrowing  countries  along  these
lines  is elaborated  by Eichengreen  and Portes  (1994),  and  Portes  (1996).
3Estimates  of developing  countries' infrastructure  financing  needs  are huge, although  precise  magnitudes
are difficult  to establish.  For East  Asia and Latin  America,  however,  average  annual investment
requirements  for infrastructure  are estimated  to be in the neighborhood  of $150  billion  and $70
billion,  respectively,  from  the mid-1990's  to 2005,  of which  25 to 40% is expected  to come  from
foreign  sources.  In India,  for example,  a government-  appointed  commission  has estimated  total
infrastructure  investment  requirements  of about US$115  to 130  billion  over the next five years,  rising
to US$215  billion  in the following  five  years.
2liberalize their capital accounts, they still remain vulnerable to speculative attacks on
their currency or foreign exchange reserves once policies go off course. As demonstrated
by the experience of Mexico in 1994 and the South East Asian countries in recent
months, exposure to such currency crises has its roots in part in the dramatic increase in
the volatility of capital flows and speed of reaction of emerging market investors. While
international support through, for instance, the recently approved IMF's Emerging
Financial Mechanisms, provides some assurance in limiting the disruptive impact of a
financial crisis, the damage to the creditworthiness of private entities with foreign
currency debt obligations could be serious. Their creditworthiness is likely to be
undermined, not only because of deterioration in business environment i.e. rising
domestic interest rates, falling stock market prices, and economic recession which seems
to characteristically follow a financial crisis,  (see Calvo, 1996, Mishkin; 1997), but also
because of a higher likelihood of governments intervening in foreign exchange markets,
and imposing controls on currency convertibility and transferability. Such a risk,
moreover, is compounded by a lack of certain forms of risk insurance and hedging
instruments for managing interest and exchange rate risks. 4
The existing literature on the determinants of country creditworthiness is vast.
This literature, whether in its traditional debt-service capacity approach (Feder and Uy,
1994; Lee, 1993; see also McDonald, 1992 for a survey of the literature), or in its most
recent strategic and bargaining framework (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Eaton, 1989;
Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Ketzer, 1989; Gennotte, Kharas, and Sadeq, 1987; and
Schwartz and Zurita, 1992) has treated country risk at an aggregate level, with no
distinction between the entity receiving foreign capital and the broader country/sovereign
risk considerations. The focus of attention has been on whether a country is able or
willing to service its foreign debt obligations, or on the incentives for loan renegotiation
or repudiation under distress. The basic underlying assumption has been that the public
sector is the main borrower in foreign capital markets, which seems to have been valid in
the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, however, when the borrowing entity is likely to be the
private sector, we must rethink this assumption. 5
Indeed, in contrast to the general obligation borrowing public sector and publicly
guaranteed type which dominated commercial external finance in the 1970s, recent
capital flows have been to private entities, raised to meet specific project or corporate
The necessary  capital  and Forex  market institutions  that  should  underpin  integrating  into global  capital
markets,  have not developed  sufficiently  in  many developing  countries.  For instance,  with  the
exceptions  of Malaysia,  Brazil,  and  Mexico,  where  currency  swap  and forward  markets  have grown
in the past two years,  exchange  markets  in developing  countries  suffer  from a number  of institutional
shortcomings,  including  illiquidity  in the spot and  forward  markets  and a lack of derivative
instruments  to hedge exchange  rate risk  beyond  a short-term  horizon  afforded  by forward  cover.
S It is also useful  to distinguish  between  the steady-state  and crisis  situations.  In the latter  (e.g.  Argentina  in
the post-Maquila  environment)  the private  sector  exited  quickly,  despite  its longer-term  exposure,  by
refusing  to honor  past commitments  or renew  credit  lines,  and it fell  to the public  sector  to restore
confidence  in international  markets  (see Caprio  et. al. 1996).
3financing needs. In 1996, for example, total private net capital flows to developing
countries amounted to $244 billion, 6 which represents a five-fold increase since 1990, and
accounts for 86% of total aggregate net long-term flows (see Figure 1). In such a
situation, should there be a currency crisis, the private sector is likely to be rationed out
and its demand for foreign exchange subordinated to that of the public sector.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II elaborates on reasons
that capital flows to infrastructure have grown so quickly in recent years, despite the
perceived high risk of such transactions. Section III develops an analytical framework for
valuation of foreign investment projects, incorporating explicitly both project and country
risk. Section IV presents the empirical results of an econometric analysis of the credit risk
premium associated with foreign loans extended to a sample of infrastructure projects.
Finally, Section V provides some policy recommendations.
Table 1.  Infrastructure  financing  raised  by developing  countries 1986-95
Typeofborrowerand  1986  1987 1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
instrument
Total  1,351 2,543  910  3,503 2,641 6,312  8,835  18,027 23,314 22,297
Public  sector  1,251 2,378  773  2,586  639 2,803  3,079  5,760  7,580  6,690
Private  sector  100  165  137  917  2,002 3,509 5,756  12,267 15,734 15,607
Loans  100  165  137  767  1,380  126  1,536  6,271  6,007  11,086
Bonds  0  0  0  150  500  740  1,155  3,867  5,810  3,262
Equity  0  0  0  0  121 2,643 3,065  2,130  3,918  1,259
Source:  World  Bank, Global  Development  Finance
II. Reasons for increases in capital flows to infrastructure
At first glance, infrastructure finance does not seem to be a viable vehicle for
attracting foreign capital to developing countries. First, exposure to currency risk, which
for foreign investment in export-oriented manufacturing industries is of a relatively minor
concern, is a critical feature of infrastructure project investment. Project revenues are
often generated in local currencies, while servicing of foreign capital, whether debt or
equity, involves payment in foreign currency. Fluctuations in the exchange rate of the
6According  to World  Bank  estimnates  (Global  Development  Finance,  1997).
4domestic currency, as well as capital controls limiting currency convertibility and
transferability, pose a particularly difficult problem for foreign investors and financiers.
Secondly, infrastructure investments are typically up-front, with a high degree of
asset specificity (although the extent of sunk investment varies from sector to sector) and
risky revenue streams stretching many years into the future. As recognized in the recent
literature on specific investments (Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; and Elden and
Reichstein, 1996), investors are hesitant to make investments in such circumstances
without adequate contractual protection. Once the investment is sunk, the incentive
system and the bargaining power of contracting parties change vis-a-vis each other. This
leads to special contracting and risk sharing problems, perhaps best exemplified by the
dominant use of BOT and BOO arrangements in international infrastructure project
finance transactions. A typical BOT structure is made up of a number of agreements set
forth in the concession agreement concluded between the host government and the project
company, formed often by a consortium of major international developers, contractors,
equipment supplier and engineering companies.
Third, the scope for divesting equity holdings in infrastructure projects through
IPOs is limited in many developing countries. As a result, project promoters would be
7 locked in their investments for several years.
Fourth, infrastructure investments are distinguished by the pattern according to
which project risks are resolved over time.8 The combination of a high concentration of
project risks in the early phase of the project life cycle, i.e. the pre-completion phase, and
relatively identifiable sources of risk once the project is completed, e.g. credit risk under
off-take agreements in power projects or market risk with telecom and toll road projects,
gives substantial value to early information. Thus, information about governments'
policies, strategies, and political stability, as well as project parameters and benchmarks
such as tariff rates, prices, and cost of capital, possesses tremendous economic value.
There is also a premium on name recognition and reputation in the field which explains
why in the power sector, for example, large, well-known companies such as Hopewell,
Seimens, ABB, and Enron dominate the market for independent power producers.
Against this background we rely on two sets of factors to explain the increase in
capital flows to infrastructure in developing countries. The worldwide move towards
private participation in providing and financing infrastructure services; and the capacity
of international capital markets to supply long-term debt capital, which is critical for the
financing of infrastructure projects with long-term assets whose costs may take 10 to 30
years to recoup.
This  contrasts  with  the  normal  corporate  finance  situation  in  which  firms  shift their  business  risks  to the
general  public  through  the issuance  of securities.
This  phenomenon  is generally  referred  to in the literature  as "the sequential  resolution  of risks" (see
Wilson,  1982).
5A. Private Participation
The commitment to private sector participation in infrastructure services is a
common policy objective in countries as diverse as China, India, Indonesia, Australia,
UK, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina.  Driven by fiscal austerity and widespread
disenchantment with the performance of state-owned utilities, many governments are
turning to the private sector to build, operate, finance, own, and transfer new power
plants, toll roads, telecommunication facilities, ports, and airports. In the developed
countries the trend is toward restructuring or unbundling integrated industry structures,
introducing competition and choice, particularly in the electricity and
telecommunications industries, and regulating those sectors where elements of natural
monopoly, associated with the increasing return to scale, exist. In developing countries
the picture is mixed, presenting a diverse portrait of different levels of achievements in
institutional, regulatory, and policy developments.
Private investors have been hesitant to invest unless supported by host
governments through tax incentives, direct financing and guarantees intended to improve
the project's cash flow or reduce risk. Such supports have varied in scale and mix from
country to country and from project to project. Four distinct types of government support
emerge from a  cursory review of recent infrastructure projects closed or negotiated:
direct financing, guarantees, tax incentives, and subsidies. Direct financing refers to
government or government agency equity contribution to the project through a joint
venture participation (as was most common in China, before the most recent
liberalization changes), or provision of a local currency term loan9, often provided  in the
form  subordinated loans to other creditors, and as an inducement to foreign banks, as in
the case of the Bangkok Second Stage Expressway project in Thailand. Tax incentives
provided to private infrastructure projects include most frequently favorable tax treatment
of income, special depreciation allowances, and lowering/ exemption of import duties on
imported machinery and equipment. Such incentives have been provided either as part of
government's strategy of promoting foreign direct investment (subject to the applicable
tax codes and provisions, most notably in Indonesia, China, and Mexico), or specifically
designed to promote private investment and financing in infrastructure,as in India and the
Philippines.
Guarantees are the most important form of government support to private
infrastructure projects. They are intended to mitigate risks faced by creditors and project
promoters, ranging from the commercial risk of non-payment of government entities to
policy and regulatory risks. Guarantees have been particularly prominent in power  -
9The largest  number  of projects  with government  equity  participation  are in China,  where until
recently, 100%  foreign  ownership  in the power  sector,  for instance,  was not allowed.  An
example  here would  be the Rhizao  Power  Project in China,  where Shandong  Power  invested
US$1  0Om  in the project.  Also, strategic  consideration  as in the case  of Paguthan  power in
India,  where the Gujarat  Power  Corporation  invested  US$23 million  equivalent,  accounting
for 12% in the project.
6projects in developing countries. In reality, governments have relied on a range of explicit
guarantees, comfort letters, and other forms of insurance, encompassing a broad range of
characteristics in the extent of coverage provided, types of events guaranteed, the nature
of the underlying risk, and whether such guarantees are explicitly incorporated in
contractual arrangements or are implicit, with no contractual basis defining the
government's liability (Dailami and Klein, 1997).
Table 2 provides a classification of guarantees offered by developing country
governments to private projects. Salient examples include Pakistan's practice of
providing a full guarantee of state-owned power purchasers and fuel suppliers in power
projects, as well as a universal fixed tariff rate (at US 6.5 cents per kWh for the first 10
years and US 5.9 cents averaged over the life of the plant); India's practice of
guaranteeing the payment obligations of state electricity boards, as well as a guaranteed,
dollar-denominated rate of return; and Indonesia's partial indexation of power tariffs,
where the Indonesian state power company, PLN, assumes part of the exchange rate risk
of electricity tariffs. In Colombia, protection against currency risk is incorporated into the
project documents and contractual agreements, as in the case of the Mamonal Private
Power Project, which stipulates an inflation-index clause in the power purchase
agreement. To the extent that changes in the value of the local currency vis-A-vis  foreign
currencies are related to domestic inflation, foreign creditors/investors will be covered,
even if project revenues are in local currency.
Table  2: Types  of Government  Guarantees  to Private  Infrastructure  Projects
1. Contractual Obligations of Government Entities
r* Guarantee of off-take in power projects
*  Birecik Hydro Power Plant, Turkey
v  Electricidad de Cortes, Honduras
*  Paguthan & Dabhol Power Plants, India
*  Mt. Apo Geothermal Plant, Philippines
'  Guarantee of fuel supply in power projects
*  Termopaipa Power Plant, Colombia
*  Lal Pir Power, Pakistan
II. Policy/Political Risk
*  Guarantee of currency convertibility and transferability
*  Lal Pir Power, Pakistan
*  Guarantee in case of changes of law or regulatory regime
*  Rousch Power, Pakistan
*  Izmit Su Water Treatment Plant and Pipeline, Turkey
III. Financial Market Disruption/Fluctuations
7*  Guarantee of interest rate
*  North-South Expressway, Malaysia
*  Guarantee of exchange rate
*  North-South Expressway, Malaysia
* Debt Guarantee
*  4 Toll Roads, Mexico
*  Termopaipa Power Plant, Colombia
IV. Market  Risk
*  Guarantee of tariff rate / Sales risk guarantee
*  Don Muang Tollway, Thailand
*  Western Harbour Tunnel, Hong Kong
*  Buga-Tulua Highway, Colombia
*  Mexico Toll Roads (Leon-Aguascalientes, Mazatlan-Culiacan, Mexico
City-Toluca)
c> Revenue guarantee
*  South Access to Concepcion, Chile
M5 Motorway, Hungary
......  .............................................................................................................................................................
B. Supply of  long-term debt capital
A major requirement of infrastructure project financiability is the availability of
sufficiently long-term debt capital. The basic intuition behind this proposition is the
casual industry practice of "matching maturities," i.e., that long-term assets should be
funded through long-term debt, and short-term assets through short-term debt.
Theoretically, the validity of this proposition rests on various manifestations of capital
market imperfections in the form of taxes, agency costs, and asymmetry of information
that result in conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors.'0 Generally
speaking, longer maturities reduce the risk that cash flows may fall short of required
amounts to service debt obligations when such payments come due. In the particular case
of project financing, where loans would have to be paid from a project's cash flows, and
where creditors have no or limited recourse to the assets of the sponsoring company, loan
maturity plays an important role in ensuring project financiability. To illustrate this point,
Figure 1 below plots the probability of loan default against project risk (as measured by
the standard deviation of cash flows) for two alternative loan maturities and terms. These
scenarios are: (i) a loan with a maturity of 5 years and interest rate of 7% per year; and
Under  perfect  market  conditions,  debt  maturity  is irrelevant,  as shown  in a seminar  paper  by Stiglitz
(1974). For a detailed  review  of literature  on choice  of debt  maturity  in corporate  finance,  see Ravid
(1996).
8(ii) a loan with a maturity of 15 years and interest rate of 8% per year. As expected, the
probability of default increases with the project risk. But it is interesting to note that the
probability of default is almost twice as high with a 5- year loan maturity than with a 15
year loan maturity, eventhough the latter carries a higher interest rate.
In practice, most private infrastructure projects closed or under preparation in
developing countries are financed with a sizable amount of foreign capital. A typical
financing mix consists of 20% to 40% (see Table 3) equity provided by project promoters
and the rest raised in the form of debt in a combination of syndicated commercial bank
loans, bond issues, bridge and backup facilities, and multilateral and export credit agency
loans and guarantees. Within debt category, bank loans, principally in the form of floating
rate loans priced off a particular benchmark, such as the U.S. treasuries or LIBOR,
account for the bulk of debt financing. Thus, in 1995, about 60% of total cross boarder
infrastructure finance was in the form of bank loans, 20% bonds, and the rest in the form
of equity capital.
The underdeveloped state of local bond markets in emerging market economies
has been an important motivating factor behind the recourse to international financial
markets for infrastructure finance. Compared to the size and depth of local equity
markets, debt markets are much smaller, less liquid, and have a narrower investor base.
The bulk of trade and transactions are centered on government papers, and corporate
issues tend to be of short maturity, perhaps five to seven years. Historically, the
development of local bond markets and infrastructure have reinforced each other -- for
instance, in the U.S., the need to finance rail roads and canals in the 19th century helped
create the U.S. debt market. With the entry of foreign institutional investors and
liberalization of domestic interest rates, debt markets in most Asian and Latin American
countries have witnessed considerable growth in recent years. Recent estimates put the
total size of Asian local markets at about US$477 billion compared to US$7429 billion in
the U.S. and US$366 billion in the United Kingdom.
Generally speaking, efforts to improve local bond markets' liquidity and lengthen
their maturity profile would require actions on three fronts: first, removal of the various
policy, regulatory and tax constraints that have impeded development of secondary
trading in private debt instruments; secondly, development of bond insurance
mechanisms to enhance the attractiveness of local currency bonds to a wider range of
investors, including foreign investors; and thirdly, upgrading the infrastructure of markets
through the establishment of efficient securities clearing, settlement, and depository
systems with scripless book-entry trading.
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return on the project = 25%; iv) Distribution  of project  revenues,  net of all non-capital
production  expenses,  assumed  to be normal  with mean = 250 and with standard  deviation
that is assumed  to vary from 12.5  to 250 with an increment  of 12.5;  and v) Debt service
ratio= 1.1.
10Table  3
Leverage  Ratio  of  Private  Infrastructure  Projects
(by  sector)
Sector  Mean  Sample  Size
(standard  deviation)
Power  73.07  28
(8.15)
Roads  63.07  15
(15.43)
Transport  77.86  7
(8.09)
Telecoms  61.25  4
(2.50)
Waste/Water  75.00  4
(12.25)
Gas  67.00  1
* Percentage  ratio of total  debt (book  value)  to a project's  investment  cost
Source: Authors' estimates based on a sample of infrastructure
projects closed between 1994 and 1996 (see below).
III. Analytical Framework
To motivate the discussion of determinants of the risk premia on private foreign
currency loans, we begin with a highly simplified model of bank lending with
exogenously specified probability of country default, or financial distress. The key factor
that distinguishes a foreign loan from a domestic one is the presence of country risk. The
importance of country risk in internationally-funded infrastructure projects is highlighted
by the fact that even if a project is commercially viable, its ability to service its foreign
debt or equity depends on broader governmental policies regarding capital mobility and
currency convertibility, which are beyond the control of the project entity. Technically,
consider the required return to creditors, or cost of debt capital, from a particular project
in a given country. This required rate of return is denoted by i and can be expressed as:
i= r + s,  where r is the risk-free rate of interest, and s is a variable reflecting the market's
combined assessment of country and project risk. In what follows, we develop a simple
model of how s is determined as a function of specific project and country risk factors.
Assessment of a country risk premium can rely on ratings assigned by credit
rating agencies to the country's foreign currency debt obligations, andlor information on
secondary market trading of sovereign bond issues, if available. In assigning such ratings,
agencies are known to take into account numerous economic, social, and political factors.
In a study of the behavior of two US credit agencies, the Moody's and Standard and
Poor's, Cantor and Packer (1996) found that six factors appear to play an important role
11in determining a country's rating: per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, external
debt, level of economic development, and default history. The authors also found
evidence of a strong relationship between ratings and market-determined credit spreads of
sovereign bond issues. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Ul Haque (1996) a close
correlation exists between country credit ratings and capital flows across all country
groupings, including heavily indebted countries."
In its most general form, the risk premium demanded by creditors from an
infrastructure project is a function of their own risk perception, availability of third-party
guarantees, and other contractual arrangements contained in the loan security package, as
well as broader country risk factors. To disentangle the influence of country and project
risk, we postulate the conditions under which the project and or the country runs into
financial distress. For the project, we adopt the standard corporate finance practice in
defining default as the condition in which the project's revenues are less than the face
value of its outstanding debt obligations. The definition of financial distress at the
country level is not straightforward, however. The existing literature has focused on
either "country credit risk" or on risks associated with the volatility of capital flows. In
the first strand, the nature of risk relates to the country's ability or willingness to service
its external debt obligations in a timely manner. The basic financial contractual
relationship is one of fixed debt obligation, with the government as the main borrower. In
the second strand, the focus has shifted to the elaboration of circumstances and factors
contributing to a country's vulnerability to speculative attacks on its foreign exchange
reserves or currency.
We use financial distress as a general term which includes not only default in the
traditional country credit risk sense 12, but also speculative attack on the host country's
reserves as elaborated by McKinnon and Pill (1997) and Obstfeld (1995). This broader
definition seems to be more relevant in describing the exposure of private entities to
broader country risk attributes.'3 Factors and circumstances which bear upon the
creditworthiness of private entities relate to direct or indirect measures adopted by the
Country  ratings  by  major  rating  agencies  show  a consistent  overall  improvements  in creditworthiness.
This  improvement  has  been  particularly  marked  over  the  past  four  years:  the  average  country  risk in
the  Euromoney's  ranking  has  increased  from  43.56  in March  1993,  to 50.  72 in March  1996,  and  the
ratings  of 16  countries  in Asia,  LAC,  and  Eastern  Europe  were  upgraded  between  September  1994,
and  December  1996,  at  least  by  one  of the  two  US  major  agencies,  Moody's  and  Standard  & Poor's.
12 For  an insightful  discussion  of the  concept  of loan  default  in international  credit  markets,  see  Eaton,
Gersovitz,  and  Stiglitz,  1986.
3 The  traditional  approach  of country  risk  assessment  has  focused  on  country  credit/default  risk.  In this
new  scenario,  the  traditional  concept  of country  risk  or sovereign  risk  arising  primarily  from  the
possibility  of default  on government  extemal  debt  obligation,  is  no longer  relevant.  A  more  relevant
concept  would  need  to encompass  types  of extemal  financial  crisis,  as experienced  by  Mexico  in
1994,  or East  Asian  countries  in recent  years.
12governments  in response  to a situation  of financial  distress  such as contractionary
macroeconomic  measures  and or intervening  directly  in the foreign  exchange  markets,
resulting  in controls  on currency  convertibility  or transferability.
Technically,  our analysis  is based  on a simple  two-period  model  of bank lending
with no taxes, transaction  cost, and third  party guarantee  and focuses  only on default  risk.
Thus, consider  a bank extending  a foreign  currency  denominated  loan  to a company  to
finance  an investment  project.  The loan  is contracted  in the first  period with the face
value D dollars  to be paid  back in the next period.  The investment  project  yields an
uncertain  cash flow X dollars  (in foreign  currency  equivalence)  in the second  period.  We
define X to include  liquidation  value of assets but net of operating  costs. The promised
payment  to debt, i.e. interest  plus principal  needs  to be serviced  entirely  from the
project's cash flows i.e. no recourse  to the credit  of project  promoters.  To incorporate
country  risk, we assume  that the project  is domiciled  in a country  with a risk of financial
distress  represented  by a random  variable  z. The random  variable  z is assumed,  for
simplicity,  to take two alternative  values  of z=l, with the probabilityp,  indicating  that the
project's host country  is in financial  distress  at the time of loan  maturity  and value z=O
with the probability  I-p. In the event  of financial  distress,  the project's ability  to service
its foreign  currency  loan obligation  in a timely manner  is adversely  affected.  Two events
are important:  (i) a general  deterioration  in business  and economic  environment
associated  with country  financial  distress,  and (ii) imposition  of government  control  and
interference  with access  to foreign  exchange.  In either  cases,  the outcome  is less than
100%  loan recovery,  even  if the project  itself is financially  viable.  In the case  of default,
let the fraction  of the project's loan  repayment  that can be recovered  be denoted  by the
parameter  a where  0 S<cx  1. For a value of a=1, the loan  can be recovered  totally and for
a=O, the loan value is totally lost.
In the case of no country  default,  the pay-off  to foreign  creditor  is determined
solely by the project's own  financial  viability,  in the sense  that whether  its cash flows are
sufficient  and adequate  to meet its contracted  loan  repayment  obligations.  In view of the
above discussion,  and bearing  in mind that a debt  contract  is a fixed obligation  which
does not entitle  debt investors,  beyond  a certain  point,  to the success  of the project,  the
return, or pay-off  to the creditor  Y, will be a function  of both project  and country  risk,
i.e., Y = 7C(z,  X), which  can be succinctly  expressed  as:
Y  (z  X)  min(D,X)  if z = 1
(amin(D,X)  if z =  )
13where
min(D,  X) =  if  X  D  (2)
The expected value of Y  can be expressed as:
D
E(Y)  {1  - p +  ap}  {D  - |(D  - x)f (x)dx},  (3)
0
where  f(x)  is the density probability function of  X.
Under the assumption that creditors are risk-neutral, the market value of the loan
V, is the present value of E(Y ),discounted at the risk free rate of interest, r. That is
v  E(Y)  (4)
1+r
Given that the loan has a maturity of one year with a promised value D, and market
value V, its expected market rate of return, i, is given:
i=D-l,  (5)
V
From equations 3,4, and 5, it is possible to derive an expression for the risk premium on
the loan, i-r, which can be shown to equal
=  (1+Xl-X +L  (6)
where X and L are defined as:
A=1-p+ap  (7)
14L= Yf|(D X)f(x)dx  (8)
0
Equation (6) describes the risk premium on a foreign currency loan to a project as
a function of both project and country risk attributes. Country risk is captured through the
parameters, a  and p, and project risk through L. In the case that there is no country risk,
i.e. X = 1, which can happen when eitherp  =0 or a=1, then i - r = L. On the other hand,
if there is no project risk, i.e., L = 0, which could happen if the loan was fully guaranteed
by a third party, then  i - r =  r)(1  2)
2
In equation (8), L defines the average loan loss on the project which will be zero
for full pay-off outcomes and positive in the case of default. Figure 3 demonstrates a
simulated value of L for various specifications of project riskiness (standard deviation of
project return). The simulation is undertaken based on the following assumed parameter
values: we take an initial investment of $100, leverage ratio of 0.8, contracted loan value
of $88 and assume that Xis  normally distributed with mean of $125 and standard
deviation raging from 20 to 35 with an increment of 0.5 to reflect projects with different
degrees of risk. As shown in figure 3, the higher the riskiness of the project, the higher
the average expected loss. Thus, for a risky investment, i.e. standard deviation equal to
35, the corresponding value of L would be 4%. Figure 4 demonstrates a simulated value
of  i - r  for various project risk values, and a (the share of foreign currency loan paid
back in the case of country default) set to 80% of the amount due. As expected, the risk
premium increases with project risk. It is also interesting to note how highly sensitive
i - r is with regard to the variation with the probability of country default.  Raising p, the
probability of country default from 5% to 10% will result in an upward shift in i - r  by
about 150 bps.
Finally, the role of risk-free rate of interest, r, in the determination of the credit
risk premium, i-r, deserves attention. From equation (6), it is evident that, i-r, depends
positively on r, implying a second-order influence of variation in the level of risk-free
interest rates on the cost of borrowing to the projects. Given the dominance of U.S.
dollars in international loan markets, a good proxy for r would be a particular U.S.
Treasury rate (short-term Treasury bill rate). This second-order effect stems from the fact
that as international interest rates decline, the market value of outstanding dollars
denominated loans increases. Thus, when international rates, i.e. U.S. rates increase, the
cost of capital to projects increases both directly and indirectly through higher credit
spreads.
15Figure 3
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16IV. Some Econometric Results:
The pricing model developed in this article offers an intuitive perspective on the
relationship between default risk premium on foreign currency loans to projects in
emerging market economies and the country and project risk attributes. To provide
evidence on this relationship, we compiled data on a sample of infrastructure projects
having reached financial closure between 1994 and 1996 in developing countries. Out of
a sample of 68 greenfield infrastructure projects, we were able to compile detailed
information regarding financing mixes, terms, size, sector, and country for only 26 of
them, which provide the database for our empirical analysis (for more details on the
larger project database, see Dailami and Klein, 1997). This information was compiled
from published industry trade sources and communication with major developers,
investment banks, export credit agencies, ECAs, and multilateral financial institutions.
We measure the credit risk premium as the spread over a benchmark (e.g. LIBOR
or US treasuries) of foreign currency private loans to infrastructure projects. 14 We focus
on private dollar-denominated loans advanced to projects in the core infrastructure sectors
of power, road, telecom, transport, and water in emerging market economies. Since most
projects had more than one private foreign currency loan, the spread used was the
weighted average of constituted loans. As summarized in Table 4, the spreads vary both
across countries and projects, within a range of 100 bps to 530 bps, with higher spreads
associated with loans to road projects.
We relate this measure of the risk premium to a set of macroeconomic and
project-specific explanatory variables, through a simple linear regression analysis (OLS).
The main macroeconomic variables include: rate of inflation, GDP per capita, and ratios
of external debt to exports, short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves, and reserves to
imports. On the project side, we have included project size, leverage ratio, and a set of
dummy variables to distinguish projects in different sectors. Table 6 reports the main
regression results under various model specifications, which we view as tentative, due to
the limited number of observations.
In interpreting our regression results, the dominant role of inflation in explaining
the spread on foreign loans to infrastructure projects emerges with clarity. The estimated
coefficient for inflation is statistically significant in all equations. Furthermore, there is
evidence that countries with domestic inflation exceeding a benchmark rate have been
further penalized -- including a dummy variable for countries with domestic inflation
rates higher than 50% per anum proved to be statistically significant. The estimates for
other macroeconomic variable, with the exception of short-term debt to foreign exchange
reserves ratio (which seems to be weakly significant), are not statistically significant. This
appears to be mostly due to data limitation rather than reflecting a genuine economic
phenomenon. With regard to project-specific variables, it is evident that road projects
have commanded the highest risk premium, followed by power projects.
14 Dummy  variables  are included  to capture  differences  in the magnitude  of risk premia  for two types of
benchmarks:  LIBOR  and US treasuries.
17This importance attached to inflation in determining risk premiums on foreign
currency loans deserves attention. Three hypothesis could be advanced to explain this
finding. First, it is conceivable that the market views inflation as a proxy for the overall
fiscal and monetary policy management of governments. In the current environment of
low global inflation, countries with higher than average inflation are particularly "singled
out" and penalized in the international capital markets. Secondly, countries with high
inflation are likely to have high domestic interest rates, thus creating an incentive for
borrowing even at higher spreads. 15 Thirdly, higher spreads could reflect the impact of
longer maturity, independent of country and project risk. While most loans in our sample
are of long-term maturity, some variations exist which could be correlated with the loan
spreads. Including maturity as an independent variable in the regression analysis proved
not to be significant.16  There exists a trade-off involved between spreads and maturity in
a loan contract. Ideally, both maturity and spread should be determined endogenously
(see Leland and Toft, 1996 for a theoretical approach along this line), but this is beyond
the scope of this paper.
5 This  demand  side  factor  has probably  been  less  influential  in the case  of infrastructure  projects  where
project  promoters  are often  foreign  companies  with access  to international  capital  markets.  Thus,  it
can be concluded  that inflation  operates  mostly  as a country  risk  variable.
16 It is difficult  to account  for the impact  of maturity  in a single  equation  regression  analysis  due to the
problem  of simultaneity,  i.e., maturity  is not an exogenous  variable.
18Table  4-Terms  of foreign  currency  loans  to infrastructure  projects
Country  Sector  Spread  over  Maturity,
benchmark,  bps  years
I Argentina  Water/Waste  2.50  10
2 Bahamas  Waste/Water  2.75
3 Chile  Power  2.00  7.5
4 China  Power  2.08  10
5 China  Roads  1.40  8
6 Colombia'  Gas  3.00  15
7 Colombia  Roads  5.30  4
8 Colombia  Telecom  1.75  7
9 Colombia  Transport  3.40  15
10 Hungary  Roads  3.00  12
11 Hungary  Roads  3.00  12
12 India  Telecom  2.25  8
13 India  Telecom  2.25  8
14 Indonesia  Power  2.00  16.5
15 Indonesia  Power  1.15  12
16 Indonesia  Power  1.48  15
17 Indonesia  Telecom  1.85  9
18 Jamaica  Transport  4.42  14
19 Pakistan  Power  2.00  12
20 Pakistan  Power  2.11  12
21 Philippines Power  1.06  16
22 Philippines Power  0.90  9
23 Philippines Telecom  2.35  8
24 Portugal  Roads  1.63  15
25 Thailand  Power  1.35
26 Turkey  Power  1.50  15
27 Turkey  Waste/Water  2.25  7
Average  11.08
*  The benchmark used is US Treasuries, otherwise LIBOR
19Table 5-  Descriptive  Statistics  for Data Used  in the Regression  Analysis
Variable  Mean  Standard
Deviation
Dependent Variable:
Spread (bps)  224.9  99.0
Explanatory Variables:
Macroeconomic Indicators:
Inflation per annum (%)  19.19  19.84
External debtlexport (%)  158.36  63.58
GDP per capita, USD  2573.48  2903.26
Short term debt/Reserves  76.88  42.94
(%)
Reserves /Import (month)  4.50  1.74
Project Variables:
Project size (investment, mln  707.04  749.08
USD)







Index Type:  Frequency
Libor  25
US Treasury  2
20Table 6-  Regression  results  explaining  the determinants  of risk premium
Explanatory variables  equation I  equation 2  equation 3  equation 4  equation 5
Intercept  -0.9613  -1.3104  -1.2403  -1.1550  -0.0823
(-0.9300)  (-1.1820)  (-1.0740)  (-1.0790)  (-0.0960)
Inflation  2.9171**  3.2725**  3.2995**  2.7781**  2.9362**
(3.6490)  (3.7090)  (3.6160)  (3.4140)  (3.5430)
ln(Extemal debt/export)  0.2321  0.2333  0.2267  0.2988
(1.4050)  (1.2590)  (1.1820)  (1.7040)
ln(GDP per capita)  -0.1013  -0.0524  -0.0440  -0.1234
(-0.9750)  (-0.4530)  (-0.4040)  (-1.1590)
Ln(Short term debt/Reservs)  0.2544  0.0963  0.1491  0.0381  0.3562*
(1.2520)  (0.5470)  (0.6910)  (0.1950)  (1.8110)
Reserves  /Import  0.0904  0.0495  0.0738  0.0426  0.1077
(1.3200)  (0.9420)  (0.9670)  (0.5870)  (1.5420)
ln(Project size (investment))  -0.0967  -0.0999
(-1.7470)  (-1.7410)
Project leverage ratio, %  -0.0020  -0.0015
(-0.4370)  (-0.3170)
Roads  0.1694  0.0251  0.0227  0.1140  0.1147
(0.7720)  (0.1100)  (0.0960)  (0.5740)  (0.5120)
Power  -0.2071  -0.2125  -0.2483  -0.2172  -0.2665
(-1.2350)  (-1.0140)  (-1.0780)  (-1.3170)  (-1.5830)
IndexType  0.0311  0.0189  -0.0037  0.1237  -0.0332
(0.1240)  (0.0670)  (-0.0130)  (0.4810)  (-0.1300)
Intercept Inflation Dummy  -1.9616**  -2.3082**  -2.321 9**  -1.9226**  -1.9774**
(-3.2000)  (-3.6450)  (-3.5490)  (-3.2110)  (-3.1110)
R-square  0.761  0.7170  0.7190  0.6670  0.5480
Number of observations  23  23  23  26  23
Note:  t-ratios are in parentheses
**  significant at the 0.05 level
*  significant at the 0.  1O level
21Variables  Definition
Inflation  Average  CPI growth  rate (92-95)
External  debt/export  Debt /Exports  of G&S  (%), end-year  1995
GDP per capita  GDP  per capita, USD, 1995
Short  term  Short-term  external  debt  to International  reserves,  %, 1995
debt/International  reserves
Reserves  /Import  International  reserves  to imports  of goods and services.
(RES times 12/MGS)
Project  size (investment)  Project's investment  in mln USD
Project  leverage  ratio, %  Total debt  to investment,  in %
Roads  Dummy  variable:  1 for a Road  project,  0 otherwise
Power  Dummy  variable:  1 for a Power  project,  0 otherwise
Index Type  Dummy  variable:  1 if the index  type is US Treasury,  0
otherwise
Intercept  inflation  dummy  Dummy  variable:  1 for countries  with average  CPI growth
rate more  than 50%
22V. Concluding  Remarks
The success with which middle- income indebted developing countries have been
able to gain access to private international finance in the 1990s is a tribute to their own
domestic economic performance, international policy in dealing with the debt crisis of
1  980s, and innovations in international financial markets. Thus, private capital flows, in
the form of foreign direct investment, portfolio investments in domestic stocks and
bonds, and issuance of equity and bonds in offshore markets, have grown in the 1990s to
dominate external finance to developing countries. In explaining this surge in capital
flows previous research has emphasized the role of domestic economic reform, external
factors such as the US interest rates, and official interventions, particularly under the
Brady Plan.
In this paper we have emphasized the role of infrastructure finance in the process
of capital flows to developing countries. Capital flows to infrastructure sectors in
developing countries have witnessed a remarkable growth in recent years from $1.3
billion in 1986 to $27 billion in 1996. Such flows embody certain desirable features
which bode well for their sustainability. In contrast to the short-term capital flows of the
1970s, flows to infrastructure projects are of a long-term nature, with debt maturities of 7
to 15 years, or permanent equity, and are invested in assets which underpin long-term
economic growth and export expansion. Secondly, by virtue of the fact that most
infrastructure financing is in the form of project financing, the claims of new creditors
and investors are differentiated and are not subordinated to any existing claims, at the
project level, although at the national level, the hierarchy of claims depend on the specific
contractual arrangements.
A key element in understanding the recent surge in capital flows to infrastructure
is the assessment of credit risks on infrastructure investments in the country risk
environment of host countries. With a few exceptions, most developing countries are still
rated as "non-investment grade" by major credit rating agencies, and as demonstrated by
the experiences of Mexico and Thailand, vulnerability to speculate exchange rate attacks
and sudden loss of investor confidence remain a feature of the current pattern of capital
flows once policies go off course. We show in this paper that the risk premia on foreign
currency loans to infrastructure projects can be related to country and project-specific risk
attributes.
The results of our paper offer interesting insights into the determination of foreign
borrowing costs to infrastructure projects in developing countries. Our regression results
are most robust with regard to the role of inflation. Using both simulation and
econometric analysis, our evidence indicates that the market demands a higher risk
premium on loans to countries with high inflation and to road projects, and that the
market seems to reward countries that have succeeded in lowering their inflation.
23Annex I - Developing  Countries'  Sovereign  Ratings  (as of April 1997)
Standard  & Poor's  Moody's
Investment  Grade
Chile  A-  Baal
Colombia  BBB-  Baa3
Croatia  BBB-  Baa3
Czech  Republic  A  Baal
Egypt  BBB-  Ba2
Greece  BBB-  Baal
Hungary  BBB-  Baa3
India  BB+  Baa3
Indonesia  BBB  Baa3
Latvia  BBB  NR
Oman  BBB-  Baa2
Poland  BBB-  Baa3
Slovak  Republic  BBB-  Baa3
South  Africa  BB+  Baa3
Tunisia  NR  Baa3
Non-Investment  Grade
Argentina  BB  B  1
Brazil  BB-  B1
Bulgaria  NR  B3
Dominican  Republic  B+  NR
24El Salvador  BB  NR
Jordan  BB-  Ba3
Kazakhstan  BB-  Ba3
Lebanon  BB-  BI
Lithuania  NR  Ba2
Mexico  BB  Ba2
Moldova  NR  Ba2
Pakistan  B+  B2
Panama  BB+  Bal
Paraguay  BB-  NR
Peru  NR  B2
Philippines  BB+  Ba2
Romania  BB-  Ba3
Russia  BB-  Ba2
Trinidad & Tobago  BB+  Bal
Turkey  B  B 1
Uruguay  BB+  Bal
Venezuela  B  Ba2
25Table 7-  Inflation'  trends in Developing  countries,  1985-1996
1985-89  1990-94  1995  1996
Average annual %  Annual %
Latin America  407.93  852.60  46.15  22.20
Argentina  863.27  505.07  3.38  0.16
Brazil  514.21  1840.87  84.38  18.23
Chile  20.35  17.48  8.23  7.36
Colombia  24.03  26.60  20.96  20.24
Ecuador  42.88  44.80  22.89  24.37
Guatemala  18.03  21.42  8.41  11.06
Haiti  2.70  24.23  25.46  17.12
Honduras  4.91  19.71  29.46  23.84
Mexico  82.00  16.31  35.00  34.38
Nicaragua  3357.64  2096.43  10.95  11.61
Panama  0.49  1.11  0.99  1.26
Paraguay  25.56  23.27  13.43  9.80
Peru  878.57  1607.41  11.13  11.54
Venezuela  33.00  41.05  59.92  99.88
Others  8.38  10.28  11.68  9.17
India  7.73  10.24  10.22  8.98
Indonesia  6.86  8.59  9.43  7.92
Jordan  7.02  7.04  2.35  6.50
Nigeria  25.88  35.83  72.81  29.29
Pakistan  6.10  10.54  12.34  10.37
Philippines  9.72  11.68  8.09  8.41
Sri Lanka  8.55  13.05  7.67  15.94
Thailand  3.19  4.86  5.71  5.81
Uganda  155.25  25.89  8.55  7.31Figure  Al: Capital  Flows  to Developing  Countries  ($billion)
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